A Handbook of Ethical Theory Part 12
I know of no way in which such problems as the above can be approached other than by the appeal to reason, as reason has been understood in the pages preceding. The reign of reason implies the recognition of all wills, _so far as such a recognition is within the bounds of possibility_. The escape from chaos lies in the evolution of the enlightened social will. Man must be raised in the scale, in order that he may have control; control over himself, over other men, over the brutes. And he cannot rise except through the historical evolution of a social order. This implies the development of the capacities latent in man.
To decide that any of his capacities shall be allowed to remain dormant may threaten future development. To cut off certain arts and sciences as not palpably serving the interests of man is a dangerous thing. To ignore the actual history of man's efforts to become a rational being, and to place, hence, all wills upon the one level, is to frustrate the desired end. It is not thus that the reign of reason can be established.
CHAPTER XXII
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL WILL
87. MAN'S MULTIPLE ALLEGIANCE.--We have seen that each man has his place in a social order. This order is the expression and the embodiment of the social will, which accepts him, protects him, gives him a share in the goods the community has so far attained, recognizes his individual will in that it accords to him rights, and prescribes his course of conduct, that is, defines his duties or obligations.
The social will is authoritative; it issues commands and enforces obedience. With its commands the individual may be in sympathy or he may not. But upon obedience the social will insists, and it compa.s.ses its ends by the bestowal of rewards or the infliction of punishment. The moral law to which man thus finds himself subject is something not wholly foreign to the nature of the individual. It has come into being as an expression of the nature of man. That nature the individual shares with his fellows.
Obedience to the social will would be a relatively simple matter were that will always unequivocally and unmistakably expressed, and did all the members of a community feel the pressure of the social will in the same manner and to the same degree. But the whole matter is indefinitely complicated by what may be called man's multiple allegiance.
Organized societies do not consist of undifferentiated units. They are not mere aggregates, both are highly complex in their internal const.i.tution. A conscientious man may feel that he owes duties to himself, to his immediate family, to his kindred, to his neighborhood, to his social cla.s.s, to his political party, to his church, to his country, to its allies, to humanity. The social will does not bring its pressure to bear upon the man who holds one place in the social order just as it does upon him who holds another.
Nor are the injunctions laid upon a man always in harmony. The demands of family may seem to conflict with those of neighborhood or of profession; duties to the church may seem to conflict with duties to the state; patriotism may appear to be more or less in conflict with an interest in humanity taken broadly. That the individual should often approach in doubt and hesitation the decision as to what it is, on the whole, his duty to do, is not surprising. Nor is it surprising that individuals the most conscientious should find it impossible to be at one on the subject of rights and duties. Two men may agree perfectly that it is right to "do good," and be quite unable to agree just what good it is right to do now, or with whom one should make a beginning.
88. THE APPEAL TO REASON.--Were there no appeal save to the social will as it happens to make its pressure felt upon this person or that, in this situation or that, there could be no issue to dispute. Dispute would be useless and sheer dogmatism would prevail. But there is such an appeal and men do make it, where they are in any degree enlightened. It is the appeal to Reason.
He who says: "I have especial rights, just because I am Smith, and so has my father, because he is my father," has no ground of argument with Jones, who says: "I have especial rights because I am Jones, and so has my father, because he is my father." Upon such a basis, or lack of basis, all discussion becomes fatuous. But if Smith and Jones agree that duties to self should only within limits be recognized, and that duties to family have their place upon the larger background of the will of the state, they may, at least, begin to talk.
The multiple allegiance of the individual does not mean that a man is subject to a mult.i.tude of independent masters whose several claims have no relation to one another. An appeal may be made from lower to higher.
We have seen that, in the organization of a given society, the social will may be imperfectly expressed. It may come about that the place in the social order a.s.signed to a man cramps and pains him, or forces him to exertions which seem intolerable. He may pa.s.sively accept it, or he may set himself in opposition to the social will as it is, appealing to a better social will. The fact that an individual finds himself out of harmony with given aspects of the social will characteristic of his age and country is no proof that he desires to set himself up in opposition to the social will in general.
In a given instance, he may be, from the standpoint of existing law, a criminal. Yet he may reverence the law above his fellows. His aberrations need not be arbitrary wanderings, prompted by selfish impulses. He may leave the beaten track because he does not approve of it, which is a very different thing from disliking it. Some will judge him to be a pestilent fellow; some will rate him as a reformer, a prophet, perhaps a martyr.
Neither judgment is of the least value so long as it reflects merely the tastes or prejudices of the individual. Each must justify itself before the bar of reason, if it would have a respectful hearing. A reason must be given for conservatism and a reason must be given for reform.
89. THE ETHICS OF REASON AND THE VARYING MORAL CODES.--Several advantages may be claimed for the ethical doctrine I have been advocating:
(1) It gives a relative justification to the varying moral codes of communities of men in the past and in the present. A code may, even when imperfect from some higher point of view, fit well a community at a given stage of its development. It may be a man's duty to obey its injunctions, even where they are not seen to be the wisest possible. One reason for bowing to custom is that it _is_ custom; one reason for obeying laws is that they _are_ laws. They embody the permanence and stability of the social will, and have a _prima facie_ claim to our reverence.
(2) In recognizing the social will as something deeper and broader than the will of the individual, as having its roots in the remote past and as reaching into the distant future, it admits the futility of devising utopian schemes which would bless humanity in defiance of the actual expressions of the social will revealed in the development of human societies. The whim of the individual cannot well be subst.i.tuted for the settled purpose of the community--a purpose ripened by generations of experience, and adjusted to what is possible under existing conditions.
(3) On the other hand, it distinguishes between lower and higher ethical codes, or codes lower or higher in certain of their aspects. It sets a standard of comparison; it recognizes progress towards a goal.
(4) And, in all this, it does not appear to decide _arbitrarily_ either what is the goal of man's moral efforts or what means must be adopted to attain to it. It rests upon a study of man; man as he has been, man as he is, in all the manifold relations in which he stands to his environment, physical and social.
There are other ethical theories in the field, of course. Some of them are advocated by men of original genius and of no little learning. Some deserve more attention than others, but all should have a hearing, at least. A close scrutiny will often reveal that advocates of different theories are by no means so far apart as a hasty reading of their works would suggest. Writers the most diverse may a.s.sist one to a comprehension of one's own theory. Its implications may be developed, objections to it may be suggested, its strong points may stand revealed. By no means the least important part of a work on ethics is its treatment of the schools of the moralists. If it be written with any degree of fairness, it may contain what will serve the reader with an antidote to erroneous opinions on the part of the writer. To a study of the most important schools of the moralists I shall now turn.
PART VII
THE SCHOOLS OF THE MORALISTS
CHAPTER XXIII
INTUITIONISM
90. WHAT IS IT?--"We come into the world," said Epictetus, "with no natural notion of a right-angled triangle, or of a quarter-tone, or of a half-tone; but we learn each of these things by a certain transmission according to art; and for this reason those who do not know them do not think that they know them. But as to good and evil, and beautiful and ugly, and becoming and unbecoming, and happiness and misfortune, and proper and improper, and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, who ever came into the world without having an innate idea of them?"
[Footnote: _Discourses_, Book II, chapter xi, translation by GEORGE LONG.] Seneca adds his testimony to the self-luminous character of moral truth: "Whatever things tend to make us better or happier are either obvious or easily discovered." [Footnote: _On Benefits_, Book VII, chapter i.]
With the general spirit of these utterances the typical intuitionist is in sympathy, although he need not a.s.sent to the doctrine of innate ideas, nor need he hold that all moral truths are equally self-evident. There are intuitionists of various cla.s.ses, and there are sufficiently notable differences of opinion. Still, all intuitionists believe that some moral truth, at least, is revealed to the individual by direct inspection (_intueor_), and that we must be content with such evidence and must not seek for proof. It may be maintained that our moral judgments--or some of them--are the result of "an immediate discernment of the natures of things by the understanding." and appeal may be made to the a.n.a.logy furnished by mathematical truths. [Footnote: This appeal has been made by famous intuitionists from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth-- Cudworth, More, Locke, Clarke, Price, Whewell.]
91. VARIETIES OF INTUITIONISM.--Forms of intuitionism have been conveniently cla.s.sified as Perceptional, Dogmatic and Philosophical.
[Footnote: SIDGWICK, The Methods of Ethics, Book I, chapter viii, Sec 4.]
To this nomenclature it may be objected that the term "dogmatic" carries with it a certain flavor of disapprobation, and predisposes one to the a.s.sumption of a critical att.i.tude, while the term "philosophical" has the reverse suggestion, and smacks of special pleading. While admitting that there is something in the objection, I retain the convenient terms, merely warning the reader to be on his guard.
(1) Perceptional Intuitionism falls back upon the a.n.a.logy of perception in general. I seem to perceive by direct inspection that my blotter is green, and that my penholder is longer than my pencil. I do not seek for evidence; I do not have recourse to any chain of reasonings to establish the fact. And I am concerned here with facts, not with some general proposition applicable to many facts. Even so, I may maintain that, in specific situations, the rightness or wrongness of given courses of action may be perceived immediately.
He who accepts the spontaneous deliverances of his conscience, when confronted with the necessity of making a decision, as revelations of moral truth, may be called a perceptional intuitionist. The deliverances must, however, be spontaneous and immediate, not the result of reasoning.
If a man reasons, if he falls back upon general considerations, if he looks into the future and weighs the consequences of his act, and, as a result, decides what he ought to do, he is no longer a perceptional intuitionist.
The perceptional intuitionist, consistently and unreservedly such, is rather an ideal construction than an actually existing person. Most men, on certain occasions, are inclined to say, "I feel this to be right, and will do it, although I cannot support my decision by giving reasons."
Many men are, at times, tempted to maintain that a given course of action is evidently right and should be followed irrespective of consequences.
But this is not the habitual att.i.tude even of men very little gifted with reflection, and it is highly unsatisfactory to those who have the habit of thinking.
Primitive man supports his decisions by an appeal to custom. Civilized man turns to custom, to law, or to general principles of some sort, which he accepts as authoritative, and which he regards as having a bearing upon the particular instance in question. That individual decisions should be capable of some sort of justification by the adduction of a reason or reasons is generally admitted. No sane man would maintain the general proposition that the consequences of acts should be wholly disregarded in determining whether they are or are not desirable.
(2) Thus, Perceptional Intuitionism gives place to what has been called Dogmatic Intuitionism--to the doctrine that certain general moral rules can be immediately perceived to be valid. The application of such general rules to particular instances implies discrimination and the use of reason.
Here decisions are not wholly unsupported. Reasons may be asked for and given. In answer to the question: Why should I say this or that? it may be said: Because the law of veracity demands it. In answer to the question: Why should I act thus? it may be said: Because it is just, or is in accordance with the dictates of benevolence. The general rule is accepted as intuitively evident, but it is inc.u.mbent upon the individual to use his judgment in determining what may properly fall under the general rule.
But there are rules and rules. It is not easy to draw a sharp line between Perceptional Intuitionism and Dogmatic, just as it is not easy in other fields to distinguish sharply between knowledge given directly in perception, and knowledge in which more or less conscious processes of inference play a part. Do I perceive the man whom I see, when I look into a mirror, to be behind the mirror or in front of it? Do I perceive the whereabouts of the coach which I hear rattling by my window, or does reasoning play its part in giving me information? And if I follow my conscience in not withholding from the cabman the small customary fee in addition to his fare, am I prompted by an unreasoned perception of the rightness of my act, or am I influenced by general considerations--the thought of what is customary, the belief that gratuities should not be withheld where services of a certain kind are rendered, etc.?
Even so, it is difficult to draw a sharp line between Dogmatic Intuitionists and Philosophical, or to regard Dogmatic Intuitionists as a clearly defined cla.s.s of any sort. A man may accept it as self-evident that a waiter should receive ten per cent of the amount of his bill; a woman may find it obviously proper that an old lady should wear purple.
Those little given to reflection may accept such maxims as these without attempting to justify them by falling back upon any more general rule. We all find about us human beings who have their minds stored with a mult.i.tude of maxims not greatly different from those adduced, and who find them serviceable in guiding their actions. But thoughtful men can scarcely be content with such a modic.u.m of reason, and they distinguish between ultimate principles and minor maxims which stand in need of justification by their reference to principles.
The intuitional moralists by profession draw this distinction. We find them setting forth as ultimate a limited number of ethical principles of a high degree of generality. It is obvious that, the more general the principle, the more room for conscious reasoning in its interpretation and application. The man to whom it appears as in the nature of things suitable that the waiter should receive his ten per cent is relieved from many perplexities which may beset the man who feels a.s.sured only of the general truth that it is right to be benevolent.
A glance at a few of the moralists who are treated in the history of ethics as representative intuitionists reveals that they are little in harmony as touching the particular moral intuitions which they urge as the foundation of ethics.
Thus, John Locke maintains that from the idea of G.o.d, and of ourselves as rational beings, a science of morality may be deduced demonstratively; a science: "wherein I doubt not but from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences, as incontestible as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out to anyone that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one, as he does to the other of those sciences." [Footnote: _Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, Book IV, chapter iii, Sec 18.]
Among Locke's self-evident propositions or moral axioms we find: where there is no property there is no injustice; no government allows absolute liberty; all men are originally free and equal; parents have the power to control their children till they come of age; the right of property is based upon work, but is limited by the supply of property left for others to enjoy. [Footnote: See above, chapter iii, Sec 10.]
These axioms cannot be identified with Samuel Clarke's four chief rules of righteousness, which inculcate: piety toward G.o.d, equity in our dealings with men, benevolence, and sobriety. [Footnote: _A Discourse concerning the Unalterable Relations of Natural Religion_, Prop. I.]
Richard Price gives us still another choice, in dwelling upon our obligation as regards piety, prudence, beneficence, grat.i.tude, veracity, the fulfillment of promises, and justice. [Footnote: _A Review of the Princ.i.p.al Questions and Difficulties in Morals_, chapter vii.] And Whewell, emulating the performance of Euclid, tried to build up a system of morals upon axioms embodying the seven principles of benevolence, justice, truth, purity, order, earnestness, and moral purpose. [Footnote: _The Elements of Morality_, Book III, chapter iv.]
These moralists press the a.n.a.logy of mathematical truth. It must be confessed, however, that a row of text-books on geometry, with so scattering and indefinite a collection of axioms, would do little to support one another; and little to convince us that they represented a coherent and consistent body of truth in which we might have unquestioning faith.